The use of diplomatic assurances against torture and other ill-treatment has increased
A. INTRODUCTION
This paper will examine the approach of the European Court of Human Rights (the Court/the Strasbourg Court) to diplomatic assurances against torture and other ill-treatment. The first part of the paper will focus on the absolute nature of Article 3 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR/the Convention) and its extraterritorial effect. The ruling of the Strasbourg Court on the extraterritorial nature of Article 3 ECHR was not generally welcomed by the Contracting States and it was against this background that the Court has, in certain circumstances, accepted States' use of diplomatic assurances. This acceptance has been criticised, however, for circumventing the absolute prohibition of torture and other illtreatment on the basis that diplomatic assurances are inherently unreliable, as the second part of the paper will explore. However, the last part of the paper will demonstrate that the Court has managed to combat these criticisms by taking a pragmatic approach to diplomatic assurances. The Court assesses the reliability of the assurances based on their quality and their ability to eliminate the risk of torture and ill-treatment in practice. It considers these factors on a case-by-case basis and in light of all the circumstances of the case before it.
Against this background, it can be argued that the assurances that have been accepted by the Strasbourg Court are effective guarantees against subjection to the proscribed treatment. As a the United States of America on two counts of capital murder. 7 Soering filed an application against the United Kingdom Government, inter alia, under Article 3 ECHR. 8 He alleged that if he was to be extradited to the United States of America, there was a serious likelihood of being sentenced to death. 9 He argued that exposure to the 'death-row phenomenon' would amount to being subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment contrary to Article 3 ECHR.
10
The Strasbourg Court held that extraditing a person would give rise to liability under
Article 3 ECHR where substantial grounds were shown for believing that the person concerned, if extradited, faced a real risk of being subjected to torture or other ill-treatment in the requesting country. 11 The Court made clear that in such cases it is the responsibility of the sending Contracting State that is at issue and not that of the receiving State. 12 This is because, the former has taken action 'which has as a direct consequence the exposure of an individual to proscribed ill-treatment'. 13 The Strasbourg Court in applying this test on Soering's circumstances concluded that his removal would constitute a breach of Article 3 ECHR.
a) The requirements of the Soering test
The Court will assess whether there are 'substantial grounds' for believing that the person concerned faces a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR in the light of all the material placed before it or material obtained of its own motion. 15 As regards the time at which the risk to the applicant should be assessed, the Strasbourg Court has repeatedly stated that in cases where the extradition or expulsion has not yet taken place 'the material point in time is that of the Court's consideration of the case'. 16 In cases where the extradition or expulsion has already occurred 'the existence of the risk must be assessed primarily with reference to those facts which were known or ought to have been known to the Contracting State at the time of the expulsion'. 17 However, 'the Court is not precluded (…) from having regard to information which comes to light subsequent to the expulsion'. However, the Court, possibly as an acknowledgment of its unfair and strict approach, has accepted that Contracting States can enforce expulsions and extraditions without being liable under the Convention when they obtain sufficient assurances from the authorities of the receiving States to the effect that the persons concerned will not be subjected to the proscribed treatment upon return. 41 Hence, the Court's acceptance of the diplomatic assurances policy can be seen as a pragmatic response to these criticisms.
C. THE STRASBOURG COURT'S APPROACH TO DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES AGAINST TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND CRITICISMS

General principles -Saadi v Italy
Although the Strasbourg Court had reviewed cases involving diplomatic assurances against torture and other ill-treatment prior to 2008, it was the landmark case of Saadi v Italy in which the Court set out the principles that guide its current approach to them. 42 The case of The Strasbourg Court, at first, considered the quality of the assurances given and in particular, their content. It concluded that Tunisia's assurances were insufficient because they were general and vague, they lacked explicit guarantees against ill-treatment, they made no reference at all to the protection of the applicant from the proscribed treatment, and they failed to specify the relevant international treaties and conventions. 49 However, the Court then made clear that even the existence of specific and explicit assurances would not be sufficient to ensure adequate protection against the risk of ill-treatment. 50 Specifically, the Court stated that even if the Tunisian authorities had given the assurances that Italy had asked for, 'that would not have absolved the Court from the obligation to examine whether such assurances provided, in their practical application, a sufficient guarantee that the applicant would be protected against the risk of treatment prohibited by the Convention'.
51
In considering whether the assurances in issue provided, in their practical application, a sufficient guarantee of safety against the risk of ill-treatment, the Court paid due regard to the general situation in the receiving State. 52 The Court in considering the human rights situation in Tunisia concluded that: trump the other evidence. 61 The Court also emphasised that diplomatic assurances would be deemed sufficient only in situations where they provide, in their practical application, effective protection against the risk of ill-treatment, demonstrating in this way that it is the practical effect of the assurances rather than the text of the assurances which matters most.
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In this way, the Court made clear that it would 'look beyond the word of the receiving State'; in other words, its assurances; and that it would examine its actions.
63
The Court correctly concluded that it would deem as insufficient the assurances given when, as in the case of Saadi, reliable sources report that the authorities of the receiving State routinely use torture and that they are unwilling to investigate incidents of torture. 64 This conclusion of the Court is to be welcomed as, against this background, the assurances given by the Tunisian authorities were essentially empty promises and would not have protected
Saadi against the risk of ill-treatment. Overall, the approach of the Court in the case of Saadi suggests that in certain circumstances, even if these circumstances are limited, 'it may consider diplomatic assurances to be a sufficient guarantee against the risk of ill-treatment'. 65 The Court's acceptance of this policy has not been welcomed however. The use of diplomatic assurances has been strongly criticised for circumventing the absolute prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment, given that, according to their opponents, assurances are unreliable, and therefore inadequate guarantees of safety against torture and ill-treatment. 66 The Council of Europe's former Commissioner for Human Rights, for example, has argued that it is wrong to subject anyone to the risk of torture on the basis of a weak and informal undertaking. 67 This hostility towards reliance on diplomatic assurances, on the ground that they are ineffective in practice is not unjustified, given that assurances have proved to be insufficient guarantees of safety in the past. 68 This was demonstrated by the notorious cases of
Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza v Sweden and Mohammed Alzery v Sweden.
The former case concerned the expulsion of an asylum-seeker from Sweden to Egypt on suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities. 70 The United Nations Committee Against Torture (CAT) found that the assurances obtained by the Swedish Government from the Egyptian authorities were not sufficient to protect the individual in issue from the proscribed treatment, as the applicant had been tortured in Egypt. 71 In the latter case, Sweden expelled
Alzery to Egypt in reliance on assurances of humane treatment. 72 The United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) likewise found that the assurances were not sufficient to protect the applicant as the applicant had also been subjected to the proscribed treatment in Egypt. 73 As a result of these cases, human rights organisations (particularly Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International), human rights advocates (such as Thomas Hammarberg) and academics (such as Lena Skoglund) have opposed the use of diplomatic assurances on the basis that they are unreliable. 74 Human Rights Watch, for example, has claimed that these cases provide 'the clearest illustration to date of the inherently flawed nature of diplomatic assurances' and thus, that they should never be relied upon.
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Concerns about the use of assurances are, to some extent, therefore justified.
However, this does not mean that diplomatic assurances are per se ineffective and that they should never be relied upon. Even though these cases have proved that diplomatic assurances may be sometimes ineffective, we should not, as Kate Jones has pointed out, 'deduce from such examples a general proposition that assurances against torture are all inherently unreliable '. 76 This is demonstrated by the fact that the assurances that were accepted by Sweden as adequate guarantees in these two cases did not meet some minimum standards of reliability.
In the case of Agiza, the CAT found that as a result of Egypt's reputation in using torture against detainees held for political and security reasons, Sweden knew or should have known at the time of the applicant's removal that he would be at real risk of being subjected 70 Agiza (n 69) paras 2. to torture. 77 Against this background, the 'procurement of diplomatic assurances, which, moreover, provided no mechanism for their enforcement, did not suffice to protect against this manifest risk'. 78 As regards the case of Alzery, the HRC likewise found that the assurances obtained by the Egyptian authorities were not sufficient to protect the applicant as they did not provide for enforcement mechanism nor were there any other external arrangements that would have provided for effective implementation of the assurances. 79 As a result, the HRC held that Sweden had failed to show that the diplomatic assurances were sufficient to eliminate the risk of ill-treatment. 80 Therefore, the assurances that were accepted by Sweden failed to meet some minimum standards. Firstly, they could not in practical terms eliminate the serious risk of torture and second, they did not contain mechanisms for monitoring their enforcement. As a result, these cases cannot be used as a proof that diplomatic assurances are per se unreliable. What these cases teach us is that diplomatic assurances should be treated with caution. They should be subjected to a thorough examination and should meet certain minimum standards before one may conclude that they can be relied upon. This is, in essence, the approach that the Strasbourg Court adopts. The Court does not seem to agree with the absolute and prejudiced opinion of the majority that assurances are per se ineffective and, should therefore never be relied upon. Rather, the approach of the Court in Saadi suggests that in certain circumstances diplomatic assurances can be regarded as a sufficient guarantee of safety. They can be regarded as a sufficient guarantee when, after careful examination, they appear to fulfil certain criteria, namely when they reach a sufficient level of quality and, most importantly, when they provide a sufficient guarantee in practice.
81
The Court made it clear that it would subject the assurances in each case before it to a thorough examination and that it would take a pragmatic approach to them. In short, the Court will accept assurances only if they are reliable. Therefore, given that the assurances that are accepted by the Court are strikingly different from the assurances that were accepted by Sweden in the two notorious cases mentioned above, the Court cannot be accused of allowing diplomatic assurances to circumvent the absolute prohibition in Article 3 ECHR. By examining the jurisprudence of the Court in depth in the next section, it will become clear that the assurances that are accepted by the Court are indeed adequate guarantees of safety.
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D. EXAMINING THE STRASBOURG COURT'S CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING THE RELIABILITY OF ASSURANCES
The Strasbourg Court assesses the reliability of assurances on a case-by-case basis and in light of all the circumstances of the case. It examines the quality of the assurances and, in particular, their scope and content. The Court takes a pragmatic approach as regards these assurances. It examines whether, in their practical application, they can provide effective protection against the risk of ill-treatment. In doing so, the Court takes into account a wide range of factors. This section will examine these factors in depth and will demonstrate that, as a result of its pragmatic approach, the Court has managed to accept only those assurances that are adequate guarantees of safety.
Disclosure of the terms of the assurances to the Strasbourg Court
The Strasbourg Court requires the Contracting States to disclose the terms of the assurances to the Court. 82 This point is well-illustrated in the case of Muminov v Russia, which concerned the expulsion of the applicant from Russia to Uzbekistan. 83 In that case, although the respondent Government claimed that it had received assurances from the Uzbek authorities, given that the Government 'did not submit a copy of any diplomatic assurances indicating that the applicant would not be subjected to torture or ill-treatment', the Court held that his expulsion breached Article 3 ECHR. 84 Therefore, in cases where the Contracting
States do not disclose the terms of the assurances to the Court, the Court does not consider the assurances as a relevant factor in the assessment of the risk. 85 The approach of the Court is to be applauded, as the Court has demonstrated that a Contracting State cannot satisfy its obligations under Article 3 ECHR by merely claiming that it received assurances from the authorities of the receiving State. The assurances need to be examined by the Court itself and they also need to fulfil the Court's criteria in order to be considered as adequate guarantees of safety.
Specific and explicit guarantees
In examining the quality of the assurances given, the Strasbourg Court takes into account the content of the assurances. 86 The Court in Saadi and other cases has raised the lack of specific 82 Othman (n 29) para 189. Although the Strasbourg Court in Saadi made it clear that even the existence of specific and explicit assurances on their own would not be sufficient to ensure adequate protection against the risk of torture and other ill-treatment, the Court seems to attach weight to the scope and content of the assurances. Even though the practical effect of the assurances is more important than their content, assurances which lack explicit and specific guarantees against the subjection of the applicant to the proscribed treatment are rejected by the Strasbourg Court. Thus, although this factor may be of limited significance as regards the extent to which the assurances can be relied upon, the Strasbourg Court insists on seeking specific and explicit guarantees.
Legality of treatment
A further factor considered by the Court is whether the assurances concern treatment in the 'death-row phenomenon'. 94 The Court, in assessing whether the assurances were sufficient to avert the risk of the death penalty being imposed, paid due regard to the fact that the imposition of the death penalty was not merely prohibited by the assurances themselves but that it was also prohibited by law. 95 In this case, the offence of which the applicant stood accused was committed before a statute restoring the death penalty in the particular federal State came into force. 96 Given that Article 1 of the United States Constitution provided that a federal State must not pass an ex post facto law and given that the United States Supreme
Court held that a federal State must not 'retrospectively impose a heavier penalty than was applicable at the time when the offence was committed', the Court held that the assurances were sufficient to avert the risk as they guaranteed that which was also prohibited by law.
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What emerges from the Strasbourg Court's approach in the case of Einhorn is that when the assurances guarantee the protection of the applicant from treatment that is in the receiving State illegal, they will be deemed as sufficient guarantees of safety. Where the law itself protects the applicant from subjection to the proscribed treatment, the assurances constitute an additional safeguard against such treatment. Therefore, the approach of the Court in accepting the assurances as adequate guarantees of safety in this context is reasonable and justified, given that a State that gives assurances not to do something which is also prohibited by law must uphold its promise.
The position and the authority of the provider of the assurances and Contracting
States as providers of the assurances
In assessing the practical effect of the assurances, the Strasbourg Court takes into account the position and the authority of the provider of the assurances. 98 The case of Baysakov and others v Ukraine illustrates this. 99 In that case it was the First Deputy General Prosecutor of the Republic of Kazakhstan who sent to the Ukrainian authorities assurances that the applicants, if extradited to Kazakhstan, would not be subjected to ill-treatment. 100 The Court found that the assurances were unreliable as 'it was not established that the First Deputy careful to uphold its promise on the ground that 'a possible failure to respect such assurances would seriously undermine that State's credibility'. 115 Thus, this is another important factor in the assessment of the reliability of assurances. According to the Court, therefore, it is the political context in which the assurances are given that makes those assurances reliable.
Acceptance of assurances by local authorities
By examining the above-mentioned cases of Baysakov and Othman, it has been made clear that the Court accepts assurances as adequate guarantees only when given by high-level officials who are capable of binding the receiving State. However, even if the assurances are given by high-level officials or by the central Government itself, it has to be further shown that the local authorities are expected to abide by them. 116 This point is well-illustrated in the case of Chahal v the United Kingdom which concerned the planned expulsion of Chahal from the United Kingdom to India on grounds of national security.
117
Although the assurances in this case had been given by the Indian Government itself, the Court found that they were unreliable as it was clear that the Indian security forces were not expected to abide by them. 118 Although the Court did not 'doubt the good faith of the Indian Government in providing the assurances', given that the violation of human rights by certain members of the security forces in Punjab and elsewhere in India was 'a recalcitrant and enduring problem', the Court was not persuaded that the assurances in issue 'would provide Mr Chahal with an adequate guarantee of safety'. 119 This, however, was not the case in Othman. In the case of Othman the risk of ill-treatment emanated from the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate (GID). 120 The Court in that case held that the assurances were sufficient to remove the risk of ill-treatment, as senior officials of the GID, from where the risk of ill-treatment emanated, approved and supported the assurances.
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By accepting assurances as adequate guarantees only in circumstances in which the local authorities, in particular the security forces, are expected to abide by them, the Court has demonstrated its insistence on the 'practical effect' criterion and it has managed to discharge the often-raised criticism that assurances are unreliable because they will not 'affect the behaviour of out-of-control security forces'. 122 The Court in the case of Chahal made clear that even if the assurances are given by high-level officials or by the Government itself, if in practical terms they do not eliminate the risk of ill-treatment, they will be deemed inadequate. Given that the assurances in Chahal were basically empty promises, as the security forces from where the risk of ill-treatment emanated were not expected to abide by them, the Court was right in rejecting them. 123 In contrast, given that the risk in the case of
Othman emanated from the GID and senior officials of the GID approved and supported the assurances, the Court was right in accepting them as adequate guarantees. 
The bilateral relations of the two States and the receiving State's record in abiding by similar assurances
As has been already mentioned in relation to Othman, the Court, in examining the practical effect of the MoU concluded between the United Kingdom Government and the Jordanian Government, took account of the fact that the assurances had been given by a Government 'whose bilateral relations with the United Kingdom have, historically, been very strong'.
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The Court considered this factor again in Al-Moayad v Germany, a case that concerned the extradition of the applicant from Germany to the United States of America to face terrorismrelated charges. 126 The applicant was extradited under the condition that he would not be detained in a facility outside the United States of America where the interrogation methods were contrary to Article 3 ECHR. 127 The Court found that the assurances at issue were sufficient to avert the danger of subjection to interrogation methods proscribed by Article 3 ECHR. 128 In doing so, the Court focused on the length and strength of bilateral relations between the two States and the United States' record in abiding by similar assurances.
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Given that Germany had carried out a number of extraditions to the United States of America in reliance on assurances that it had found to be respected in practice, such assurances were found by the Court to be sufficient.
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As noted, opponents of the diplomatic assurances policy often contend that assurances are given by States which are 'known to torture' and are therefore unreliable. 131 The United
States, for example, which provided assurances in Al-Moayad, does not have 'an entirely positive human rights record', according to Alice Izumo. 132 It does not however follow that in the particular circumstances of the case the assurances given by them could not be relied upon. Even though the United States' human rights record might not be entirely positive, the Court determined that the assurances given by them would be respected in this particular case. The Court's approach, which focuses on the context in which the assurances are given, seeks to ensure compliance. Given that Germany's relationship with the United States had been strong in this context and given also that assurances had been respected by the relevant authorities in all extradition cases, the assurances given by them in this case could be relied upon. Thus, although the assurances are usually given by States that may be criticised regarding their human rights record, the Court assesses the likelihood of compliance by looking at the context in which they are given.
Examination of the assurances by domestic courts
The Court in the case of Al-Moayad, in assessing the reliability of the assurances, also gave weight to the fact that the assurances had been examined by the German courts. 133 The
German courts examined the assurances given by the United States of America and concluded that they could be relied upon. 134 This was taken into account by the Strasbourg
Court. 135 Similarly, in the case of Othman, the Court paid due regard to the fact that the assurances in issue 'withstood the extensive examination' which had been carried out by an independent and domestic tribunal, being the Special Immigration Appeals Commission.
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One may argue that the Court should not give any weight to the assessments carried out by the domestic courts of the sending Contracting States, given that the domestic courts may fail to make an objective assessment in their enthusiasm for deportations and deportations with assurances policy. 137 However, given that the Court does not rely solely on the assessments carried out by the domestic courts of the sending Contracting States and examines the assurances itself, the assurances that are accepted as adequate guarantees are those which withstood the Court's examination and which fulfilled the Court's criteria for reliability.
Previous ill-treatment
A further factor considered by the Court in assessing the practical effect of the assurances is whether the applicant had previously been ill-treated in the receiving State. 138 The case of 145 In light of these difficulties, the Court correctly concluded that it would be difficult to see whether such assurances would have been respected. 146 The Court was therefore right in rejecting them.
Post-transfer monitoring mechanisms
The assurances in the case of Othman were accepted by the Court as adequate guarantees partly due to the fact that they provided for monitoring mechanisms that could ensure and verify compliance with them. 147 The Court, in concluding that the Adaleh Centre (a human rights organisation based in Jordan) was capable of verifying compliance with the assurances, took account of the fact that the Centre was independent from the Jordanian Government, as it was mainly funded by the government of the United Kingdom, and also of the fact that the 
Human rights situation in the receiving State
As has already been explained, the Court in the case of Saadi held that the assurances given by the Tunisian authorities were unreliable, as, in practice, they could not eliminate the risk of ill-treatment, given the widespread use of torture in Tunisia. 153 Even though the Court has stated that 'it will only be in rare cases that the general situation in a country will mean that no weight at all can be given to assurances', the Court in a number of cases since Saadi has
given no weight at all to assurances from States where torture was endemic or persistent.
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The Court in three similar cases found that the human rights situation in the receiving State excluded accepting any assurances whatsoever. authorities. 155 Given that reliable sources described the practice of torture in Uzbekistan as systematic, the Court was not 'persuaded that assurances from the Uzbek authorities offer a reliable guarantee against the risk of ill-treatment'. 156 The human rights reputation of the receiving State is, in some cases, a determinative factor for accepting the assurances, rather than for rejecting them. The human rights reputation of the United States, for example, was one of the factors that led the Court to conclude in the admissibility case of Babar Ahmad and others v the United Kingdom that the assurances at issue could be relied upon. 157 The case concerned the planned extradition of individuals suspected of being involved in terrorism-related crimes from the United Kingdom to the United States of America. 158 The Court, in considering the assurances given, accorded a presumption of good faith to the United States Government. 159 The Court noted that this good faith presumption arose out of the United States' positive human rights record, given that it had a 'long history of respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law'. 160 As a result, the Court held that the applicants' contention that the authorities of the United States of America might designate them enemy combatants in breach of their assurances was inadmissible.
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The cases of Sultanov, Yuldashev and Ismoilov demonstrate the Court's insistence on the 'practical effect' criterion. In cases where the assurances are given by States 'where torture is endemic or persistent', and the assurances are therefore insufficient to avert the serious risk of ill-treatment, the Strasbourg Court has made it clear that they would not be accepted as adequate guarantees. 162 In contrast, given that the assurances in the case of Babar Ahmad were obtained from the United States of America which, according to the Court, maintains a positive human rights record, they were accepted as adequate guarantees. 163 Thus, the often-raised criticism that assurances are unreliable because they are given by
States which are 'known to torture' is not valid in the case of the Strasbourg Court, as the Court does not accept assurances from States where torture is endemic or persistent.
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E. CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the approach of the Strasbourg Court to diplomatic assurances against torture and other ill-treatment. It has been argued that although the diplomatic assurances policy has been criticised for circumventing the absolute prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment on the basis that diplomatic assurances are per se unreliable, the Strasbourg Court, as a result of its pragmatic approach, has accepted those assurances which are adequate guarantees of safety. The Court seeks to ensure that the assurances it accepts as sufficient guarantees will be respected in practice. It does this by examining the reliability of assurances on a case-by-case basis and in light of all the circumstances of the case. It assesses not only their content, but also factors which are external to the assurances, such as the human rights situation in the receiving State and such States' human rights practices.
Furthermore, by examining such a wide range of factors, the Strasbourg Court has implicitly highlighted that assurances must be able to withstand its extensive examination in order to be accepted as adequate guarantees of safety. Therefore, the Court cannot be accused of circumventing the absolute prohibition to be found in Article 3 ECHR as it accepts only the assurances that can remove the risk of torture and ill-treatment in practice. In other words, the Strasbourg Court has kept faith with the absolute prohibition of Article 3 ECHR as a result of this pragmatic approach. This approach has also allowed Contracting States to protect their national security from criminal acts and in particular, from acts of terrorism, without breaching their Article 3 ECHR obligations. In this respect, it can be argued that its approach is effective.
